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Notes 29 US military forces are directed to develop the capability and doctrine for Space control. To effectively employ forces in its achievement, the tasked operational commander will require an understanding of the operational factors space, time, and force. Analysis of these factors reveals the following:
The unique character of Space alters the concept of position, and therefore positional defense, complicating the Space denial mission. The nature of time in Space warfare may obviate the use of anti-satellite weapons for Space defense and protection against deployed weapons systems, requiring other approaches to the problem. The nature of current forces is unsuitable for the day when enemy forces are capable of Space denial actions, requiring a change of philosophy in force architecture.
For protection of our critical Space systems, territory and citizens, US forces must defeat enemy threats before they reach orbit. The operational commander must consider attacking control sites, Space system production facilities, and launch complexes along with orbiting Space forces.
Since satellite defense will be extremely difficult, no single Space system should be so critical as that its loss or denial would significantly degrade conduct of its mission area.
Systems designers should continue to pursue current initiatives in low observables technology, and satellite constellations. Contemporary Space systems do not comply with this design philosophy, therefore the architecture must change to reflect the demands imposed by Space warfare. Access to orbit must be improved with spacelift systems capable of generating sortie rates comparable to today's tactical aircraft, rather than today's reusable launch vehicles. Additionally, improvement in the ability to maneuver satellites is required.
• PREFACE This paper was begun as a means of drawing parallels in Operational Art applications between current terrestrial and future Space warfare. Having done some prior study of current Space systems and capabilities, I was intrigued by the fact that the US currently advocates achievement of Space control and denial missions, but has no forces for their conduct. I wondered how future forces would be used to achieve Space control, and determined to use the principles of Operational Art to investigate the question. As it happens, this subject was a much more ambitious undertaking than intended. Intentionally limited to "only the operational factors," it attempts this analysis to determine general concepts for employment of generic weapons in future Space warfare. It intentionally avoids specific, quantifiable system capabilities in favor of broad weapons and systems types. Where examples were required for clarity, occasional reference was made to contemporary systems or specific weapons concepts.
The more time spent thinking about the subject, the larger it appeared. I fear I have merely scratched the surface.
To avoid muddy thinking and unclear analysis of operational factors in Space, they have herein been analyzed in "cookbook" fashion as separate, unrelated entities. In the real world, the operational commander tasked with Space control will find them intricately inter-related as he attempts to deny, protect and strike from Space. To be of use, the individual points ascertained by analysis of separate factors had to be integrated. The "Conclusions and Recommendations"
chapter provides examples of this integration, going beyond the "Combined Factors" to implications provided by the sum of the analysis.
The appendix, "Orbit" provides a skeletal background for the body of the paper. While not thorough enough to provide a full dissertation on orbitology, it provides enough information to support the analysis within the paper, and should be read first by those unfamiliar with general principles of orbit.
My thanks to Professor Milan Vego, whose patience must surely have been worn thin. To competently and efficiently plan the use of and employ Space forces, the operational level commander and his staff will examine the operational factors space, time, and force as part of the process. Their initial attempts to employ operational art in the development of plans may encounter unexpected snags. They will find that the nature of the medium tends to transform familiar terrestrial concepts, and that the forces they command are ill suited for combat.
This paper examines the operational factors space, time, and forces in the Space medium to shed light on this emerging area of warfare, expose these transformations, and recommend "course changes" where it appears that current philosophies will hamper the future ability to achieve Space control. It will be shown that the nature of the space transforms the concept of position, with implications for Space denial. The nature of time also provides challenges for Space defense, providing little warning upon which to react.
The nature of current forces and Space combat will be shown to be incompatible.
Recommendations will follow from these revelations. Topography and Climate: While hardly intuitive, there exist "terrain features" in Space. The medium of Space defines the "landscape," which looks and behaves differently than its terrestrial cousin. Nevertheless the considerations applied by an operational commander to a terrestrial theater still apply in Space. To be effective, he must first understand the analogies between them.
The interaction between the Earth's and Moon's gravitational fields produces one of the features. There exist two stable points in the Earth-Moon system known as Lagrangian points L-4 and L-5. 9 These positions, 60° ahead of and behind the moon's position along the lunar orbital path, are analogous to gravitational "hilltops." (Figure 1 ) In this context, "stable" means that objects at these positions will remain there until disturbed by an external force. Once disturbed (launched), the object would be gravity assisted .towards either the Earth or Moon, while gravity would hinder an object attempting to take either position.
Grayitationally speaking, the holder of positions L-4 and L-5 controls the Earth-Moon system. 10 The operational commander might attempt to take advantage of the terrain by deploying kinetic ASAT weapons to these hilltops.
Lagrangian Points
The Space "climate" has features unlike terrestrial media. It is effectively devoid of atmospheric pressure, and exhibits extremely low temperatures, making for a harsh and demanding environment. Lacking an atmosphere, there is no real weather or resistance to motion. Solar and cosmic radiation is the environmental factor that replaces weather in Space.
Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) and Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO) systems must operate in fields of radiational disturbance known as the Van Allen belts, where high doses of radiation may interfere with systems' operation, or accelerate their natural degradation. These radiational disturbances increase with solar flare activity on a cyclic basis, and can significantly affect Space systems' performance." Like traditional weather, the operational commander might plan to exploit these cycles to obscure or conceal his actions against systems susceptible to radiational
interference. An example might be using a directed energy ASAT weapon to damage an enemy communications satellite during a radiational flare-up, giving the appearance of natural system degradation vice hostile action. The distance and relation between orbiting objects is dynamic, thus, combat between orbiting systems (ASAT, Space surveillance, Electronic Attack) will be complicated by the ever changing spatial relationship between them.
Dynamics:
The dynamics of the factor space are peculiar because of the nature of Space orbits. Given that two objects may occupy the same orbit, the mere act of occupying an orbit does nothing to exclude an enemy from it, as in terrestrial warfare.
Thus "gaining space" is not a zero sum game, as in terrestrial warfare.
Loss of He would establish these zones based on their relation to the disputed surface positions.
Imagine this scenario: Country "A" lies above 25° latitude, and is at war with country "B,"
which lies on the equator. Inclined orbits could overlie both nations, while equatorial orbits would overlie country "B" only. Since forces (such as precision strike satellites) in both inclined and equatorial orbits would threaten country "B," it would need to blockade country "A" to
achieve Space control. Country "A" could simply establish an orbital exclusion zone (all orbits inclined greater than 20°, for instance) to achieve the same objective. (Figure 4 ) Orbits that overlie only one of the belligerents in a conflict will confer offensive advantage to its enemy, and defensive significance but no corresponding offensive advantage to that belligerent through their denial. 13 It will be critical for a commander to understand the offensive or defensive relationship of orbits to terrestrial positions so that he may take appropriate and efficient action for Space denial.
Analysis of the factor space reveals that Space control efforts will be tremendously affected by the nature of selected orbits, the dynamic spatial relationship between friendly and enemy orbital systems, and the relationship of each orbit to subjacent surface points.
While familiar concepts such as Lines of Communications and blockades may exist, the peculiar nature of position and distance transforms them. Selection of orbits is a matter of utmost importance. Reliance on traditional positional defense concepts may misguide the commander in that selection.
The Factor Time
Inevitably, thought about Space conjures images of "warp drive," creating the impression that a commander would derive great flexibility from instantaneous access to deployed Space systems and capabilities. On the contrary, the nature of Space imposes rigid time constraints upon the commander, who must adjust his plans accordingly. The nature of the factor space, discussed above, affects the nature of the factor time. The speed required of orbiting Space systems can make interaction between them occur rapidly, allowing short opportunity windows for action.
Warning and Reaction Time:
In defensive missions, the factor time favors the enemy. where indications and warning may be ambiguous, and hostilities may not be anticipated.
Protecting satellites against deployed Space ASATs further complicates the problem.
Since the threat sector is so large and dynamic, detection takes more time, further limiting 12 available reaction time. Such rapid detection and response may prove to be impossible.
Other aspects of time may provide the solutions to these problems. This may provide the solution to the warning and reaction time problem discussed above. Rather than attempt to defend against deployed threats, the operational commander may require the authority to attack Space systems being developed or in their deployment and preparation cycle.
The time required to develop and deploy Space systems is problematic for friendly Space control efforts. Under the current architecture, decisions to initiate deployments of forces would take months to execute. In terms of Col. John Boyd's "OODA Loop" (observe, orient, decide, act, observe...) the "Act" phase of the commander's decision cycle is grotesquely out of proportion to the nature of warfare. The rapidly accelerating decision capability provided by today's information systems exacerbates the disparity between phase lengths. Lacking the ability to rapidly develop and deploy systems (act), the commander's decision cycle may stall after the orientation phase, thus ceding the initiative to the enemy.
Time for Maneuver and Counter-maneuver:
The purpose of maneuver is to achieve a position from which the enemy center of gravity, critical capabilities, or vital objectives may be attacked.
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In Space control, where position and orbit are so closely related, maneuver is transformed into the achievement of advantageous orbit, or the use of movement and mobility to achieve that orbit in pursuit of operational objectives. The time 13 required for maneuver depends upon the type of orbits required, the amount of fuel available to effect the maneuver, and the number of systems involved. The higher the altitude, inclination, or eccentricity of the orbits, the more time required after launch. Time for transfer from one orbit to another depends on the difference in inclination, altitude and eccentricity of the orbits --the greater the differences, the longer the time. Maneuver may be inherent to the deployment of systems, or given the ability of satellites to conduct orbital transfer (change orbits), may occur immediately prior to operations from the new orbit. The continuous movement of orbiting systems may mask the actual maneuver of Space systems.
Since many insignificant points may be overflown during the orbit, the objective of the maneuver may be difficult to distinguish by mere observation. Tradeoffs between waiting for deployment from the surface, and expenditure of critical on-orbit fuel reserves may be required, depending on the criticality of systems involved or threatened.
Counter-maneuver, intended to counteract the maneuver of enemy forces, can take place both by orbiting and terrestrial forces. The objective of the initial maneuver will determine the appropriate types of counter-maneuvers, and therefore the time required. Two examples follow:
1. Side "A" conducts orbital transfer of a missile warning satellite, to better monitor a suspected ballistic missile launch site. Side "B," aware of the maneuver, relocates the weapons or launchers. The mobility of the terrestrial force determines the time requirement.
2. Side "A" launches an electronic attack satellite to an orbit synchronous with side "B's" critical communications satellite. Side "B" must affect an orbital transfer, to an orbit compatible with its mission, and out of the electronic attack satellite's field of regard. The combined capability of the opposing forces determines the time requirement.
14 In both cases the time required for maneuver and counter-maneuver is situational.
Advantage accrues to the side that uses the most rapid and efficient means of countermaneuver available.
Time for concentration and counter-concentration:
The dynamic nature of different orbital paths makes concentration of force difficult to achieve. In Space, concentration of forces does not merely entail deployment of forces to a forward area in preparation for operations.
Concentration of forces in perpetual motion requires synchronization and alignment of their fields of regard. Since orbits are cyclic, concentration of force from different systems will occur on a fixed and cyclic schedule. By mixing orbits, concentration can take place more or less frequently. For instance, concentration of a GEO system with a LEO system will occur as frequently as every 30 minutes, for a brief duration (every time the LEO system passes below the GEO system). Other orbits will interact differently. Systems may be placed in complementary orbits, such that they are continuously concentrated (e.g., satellite clusters). The concentration schedule will remain fixed, until further deployment, maneuver or attrition occurs.
Concentration of terrestrial with Space forces can occur, but will be restricted by the schedule of the Space system, and the time required for terrestrial force concentration.
The factor time restricts the operational commander's flexibility. Time factors will prevent effective defense against deployed (orbiting) threats, and even terrestrial based threats will present challenges as DEWs proliferate. The length of the deployment cycle presents vulnerabilities which the operational commander should attack if possible. The counter-offensive is vastly preferable to the defense. For maneuver and counter-maneuver between Space and terrestrial forces, terrestrial forces may hold the time advantage due to inefficiency of deployed Space systems. The cyclic nature of orbit will determine opportunities for force concentration.
15

THE FACTOR FORCE
The factor force is said to be "the most critical for accomplishing any military Since the U.S. has yet to deploy Space "shooter" systems, it is elementary that the contemporary architecture is heavily sensor oriented. The current force derives combat power from information production rather than destructive capability. As Space control efforts gain importance in response to the emerging threat, this will have to change. More disturbing than the type and mix of forces is the inability to reconstitute many critical systems, or to redeploy any
16
Strategie force reserve. Each satellite system currently deployed requires individual control,
11
providing an inflexible, controller intensive force.
Force Size:
The size of the current Space force is large in the sense that it would be difficult to protect, and is spread over a large area. Yet each element (communications, weather, navigation, imagery, etc.) of the force is composed of a small number of highly capable assets. The Navy's new UHF Follow On (UFO) communications system will consist of only ten satellites, and the Space Based Infra-Red System (SBIRS) early warning system, only six. 23 Failure or destruction of any of these few satellites would severely degrade the mission capability provided by their systems --a significant vulnerability. Under the current philosophy, for instance, an imagery satellite will be designed to last many years. It will provide the highest resolution achievable, given the size limitations of the booster that will place it in orbit. This creates very expensive satellites, and results in very few being produced. 24 Thus, the size of the current force has much to do with the high quality of the elements. Because the "will to fight" relies upon the warfighter's belief in the ethical nature of his actions, the pervasive view of the "sanctity of Space" will be counterproductive to warfighter morale during a Space war. Public support for Space control efforts will suffer from the ethical question as well, at least until an enemy attack demonstrates the necessity of Space weapons.
Training and Education: Training of the vast majority of military personnel in
Space systems and capabilities is practically non-existent. Ambiguity between the reality of deployed military systems to Space, and international law inhibits doctrinal and technological development, and the cooperation of allies in fielding Space control forces. So controversial is the idea of weaponized Space, that there is reluctance by USCINCSPACE to even discuss weapons concepts. Clearly, change is required to prepare more military personnel to consider the conduct of Space control. The opinion of the public, upon whose support the government depends, must also be shaped by education to the possible threats to our Space forces and capabilities.
The tangible and intangible elements of force are ill suited to the stated mission.
Within the current paradigm, the operational commander faces many obstacles. Doctrine and forces for Space control must develop in parallel. Doctrine must recognize and compensate for current limitations while providing conceptual guidance for force improvements. As the force mix becomes more balanced between sensor and shooter systems, the vulnerability of deployed systems will decrease. Likewise, as lift capability and operational tempo increase, • cost will decline. As a result, the requirement for extremely complex satellites will decrease, further reducing U.S. vulnerability to attack.
Space control forces and systems must provide the commander real-time access to Space to exploit enemy vulnerabilities or the successes of his own prior actions. Examples of required capabilities are: maneuver or counter-maneuver of Space assets to more advantageous orbits; deploying reserve systems;_using Space forces to reinforce operational deception schemes 29 ; or destroying an enemy Space asset that has become vulnerable for a discernible period.
Designed for a peaceful environment, today's Space force will prove unwieldy in combat. Destruction of individual satellites will significantly degrade overall capability.
Lacking a reserve, reconstitution will happen too slowly to be effective. Public support and warfighter morale will suffer from ethical dilemmas. The commander's flexibility in employment of forces will suffer from lack of access to Space and lack of maneuver capability. These are all consequences of the underlying philosophy of the sanctity of the Space environment. . Education of warfighters and public threat awareness are required to allow doctrinal and force evolution concomitant with achievement of Space control.
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THE FACTOR SPACE -TIME -FORCE Now that the factors have been examined in isolation, they must be combined. The interaction of the factors produces significant effects.
The operational commander tasked with Space control will have a tremendous amount of space relative to the allotted forces for controlling it. Space defense satellites will defend against terrestrial and Space based threats, further increasing the disparity of scale between the number of weapons and their area of regard. The same may be true for a Space Based Laser, with an ASAT as well as strike role. Thus the force to space ratio in Space control will be characteristically low. Even with a shift in philosophy from large, high value satellites to networked constellations of tiny, inexpensive ones, the force -space ratio will remain low due to the vastness of the area.
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While certain orbits may lend themselves to particular force applications, (LEO for imagery, GEO for communications, etc.) there may be other considerations of the factor space that will dictate compromise. The boundary between the atmospheric realm and Space is undefined and indefinite. Atmospheric drag may affect satellites below 300 nautical miles, leading to orbital decay, thus restricting the use of the lower orbits for long life-span satellites. 31 The nature of satellites optimized for GEO orbits may be incompatible with radiational interference, requiring design modification or sub-optimal deployment.
In conflict between satellites, orbital selection will again be critical. While system design will dictate the flexibility of deploying "shooter" satellites, certain aspects of this area will be fundamental. Kinetic Kill Vehicle (KKV) weapons satellites should be deployed to high altitude orbits to take full advantage of gravity. 32 These high orbits are also defensively advantageous against enemy kinetic ASAT systems, providing greater reaction time against weapons launches. Since directed energy weapons are unaffected by gravity, the offensive 
LEO vs HEO Satellites
advantage of high altitude is not applicable, while the defensive advantages still apply.
Against an enemy using DEWs, the defensive advantage of high altitude is also lost.
To provide the greatest effect from the fewest satellites, correct selection of orbit is imperative. This is applicable in both Space-to-Space, and Space-to-ground applications.
Satellites placed in high altitude orbits may be capable of simultaneous terrestrial and Space surveillance. A lower orbit reduces the number of orbits within the sensor field of view during terrestrial surveillance. Space force's ability to achieve mobility and flexibility, but would therefore be a primary target for enemy Space denial efforts. Space also becomes relatively simple, given the tools, since detection assets can focus on a limited threat sector. Space LOC interdiction could be conducted by Space, air or ground forces.
<A> Friendly Satellite
As previously discussed, deployment of forces to Space is complex and expensive.
These factors combine to slow the tempo of deployment to space, which means that force ~ time is relatively static. Changing the capability of forces will alter this static nature. Realtime access to the theater, and capability for maneuver within the theater are the critical enablers. The US must develop and provide the commander forces which provide these capabilities. With these issues solved, the commander's concept of time becomes less restricted.
Culmination: Due to their nature, Space forces are susceptible to culmination over time. Clausewitz defined the culminating point as "the point where the remaining strength is just enough to maintain a defense, and wait for peace." Defined in the Space context, it is the point when the overall force application capability has been depleted by maneuver, counter-maneuver, and weapons expenditure. After this point, resistance to the enemy denial effort is not possible, and Space systems may be unable to support operations. Regardless of the level of investment in lift and orbital maneuver capability, an effective surface based ASAT capability, combined with attack against control facilities will enable a commander to force culmination of the enemy Space control effort. Even with improved access, the remoteness of the Space theater will cause its operational cycle length to greatly exceed that of terrestrial forces. The more robust a Space force structure is, the more time it will take to maintain and sustain it, (refueling and re-arming of weapons satellites, repositioning, redeployment, etc. The operational commander may base orbital selection decisions on the relationship between space and time. The altitude of an orbit affects both its circumferential distance, and the speed required to sustain the orbit. Higher altitude orbits cover longer paths at slower speeds. In LEO, a satellite will circumnavigate the Earth many times per day; in HEO, perhaps twice; in GEO, exactly once per day. Once positioned in Space, satellites will move relative to the Earth and every other satellite on a repetitive, predictable and cyclic basis until maneuvered. Effective monitoring of Space will allow the commander to accurately predict opportune times for action, based on the orbital placement of targets, weapons, and systems.
The nature of orbital Space is such that it legally and effectively offers direct access to the enemy's depth. Thus, it is a direct extension of the terrestrial space in which the enemy will operate ~ indeed a portion of his depth. Depending on the technological competence of the enemy, he may or may not have access to this critical portion of his space. A competent Space-faring nation will have access to everyone's. Effective Space control will seal off the theater from enemy forces, similar to a maritime blockade (albeit with a military, vice economic objective). Thus the operational depth of the belligerents seamlessly adjoins and is accessible from Space. Although directly superjacent to the surface, the Space overlying a nation is not analogous to the waters immediately off its coast. It is no easier to occupy the space overhead than its orbital locus around the globe (the entire orbit is one "position"). access to a significant orbit immediately yields the advantages of all points which comprise it.
These facts indicate that use of ASAT for Space denial may be impotent for preemptive strategies. Denial of Space must be proactive; conducted in the enemy's depth before his forces can achieve orbit. To this end the commander could institute orbital exclusion zones and Space blockade operations.
Fortunately, the current length of deployment cycles creates the vulnerability we require for exploitation against the enemy within his depth. It is a vulnerability we must overcome ourselves. This dictates development of new forces, such as lift systems with aircraft-like sortie rates. Defenses other than ASAT systems must be developed. Low observable technology in combination with high altitude orbit would improve survivability of forces, but might require design modifications to deal with radiational interference of the environment. Rapid threat detection, and satellite protection and maneuver capability must be pursued. Low force-space ratios will require US forces to understand enemy capabilities, so that the commander can efficiently thwart hostile strategies.
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Change is required, in line with the following recommendations:
•The services must increase warfighter education on Space systems, capabilities and vulnerability.
•US military Space capabilities must be dispersed in large, maneuverable constellations of satellites, to make them less lucrative as targets.
•Research and design of offensive and defensive Space weapons must continue.
•Space system development and deployment timelines must be shortened to reduce US vulnerability to Space denial efforts.
•The US must design and procure flexible, rapidly recyclable spacelift systems for military use. USCINCSPACE indicated the sensitivity of the issue, and focused his discussion on other mission areas.
Analysis of operational factors in
29
Orbital transfer of a non-essential satellite to a position above decoy forces could convince an enemy that the decoy force was the primary effort in a conflict.
For more on constellation theory, see Mork. 31 Muolo, Volume Two, 73. 32 KKVs are projectiles that use kinetic energy as their destructive force, as opposed to explosives. They may be employed against any target; terrestrial or Space based. Space launched KKVs against terrestrial targets benefit from reentry velocity, which greatly boosts their kinetic and thus destructive energy. For more information, see Air University Spacecast 2020. Vol. 2: 0-15-0-17. 33 Certain types of directed energy weapons propagate well in Space but not in the atmosphere, and would require Space basing if developed. LEO would be a good position for such weapons, since their speed and orbital period would allow them to revisit possible targets frequently, while isolating the target axis above the The reason they remain in Space, rather than crashing to the surface is because their velocity component parallel to the surface is sufficient to compensate for the curvature of the planet. A more technical explanation is that the centrifugal force acting on the orbiting satellite (due to its speed) is in equilibrium with the centripetal force provided by gravity. Since gravity acts from the center of mass of the planet, satellites orbit around a planet's center in a single plane of motion which may intersect the planet along any major axis. Thus a satellite cannot orbit around a fixed latitude, other than the equator, but may be inclined in order to pass over higher latitudes or the poles. Orbits can be circular, where the satellite holds a fixed altitude above the surface or, more commonly, elliptical. In elliptical orbits, the planet's center lies at one of the foci of the elliptical path. The further apart the foci of the ellipse are, the greater the eccentricity of the orbit is said to be. Orbits are classified as Low Earth Orbit (LEO), between 150 to 800 kilometers altitude; Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), between 800 and 35,000km;
geosynchronous Orbit (GEO), at approximately 36,000km; and Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO), in which a satellite's altitude varies in along an elliptical path, from 250km at perigee to a maximum of approximately 700,000km at apogee (See figure 7) . LEO is useful A-l for close observation by surveillance systems, and allows rapid revisit of locations on Earth's surface. It is disadvantageous for viewing large areas of the surface at one viewing, due to its proximity and speed. MEO orbits are commonly used for navigation satellites, like the US GPS and Russian GLONASS systems. GEO is useful for systems requiring a stationary position or continuous view of one portion of the Earth's surface. Communications satellites are routinely placed in these orbits. HEO orbits are useful because of their varying satellite speed along their orbital flight path and broad field of view from apogee. By varying the orientation of the orbit, the satellite will decelerate to view the objective surface area for prolonged periods towards the orbital apogee (high point), and accelerate towards perigee, which will be oriented over areas of lesser interest.
The rotation of the Earth beneath a satellite complicates visualization of a satellite's ground track. Equatorial orbits are fairly straightforward, as are geostationary orbits, but HEO and inclined orbits are more difficult to visualize. As altitude increases, velocity decreases, lengthening the orbital period. Since the planet's rotation is a fixed value, it becomes apparent that by altering the altitude, shape and inclination of an orbit, an infinite number of ground tracks are possible. In a polar orbit, a satellite may literally overfly every point on the planet.
Once placed in orbit, objects are in continual motion without further expenditure of effort (energy or fuel). Satellites in geosynchronous and geostationary orbits appear motionless relative to the planet's surface, but are actually moving at sufficient speed to match the planet's rotation. Geostationary orbits are very precise geosynchronous orbits, which literally do not move in space relative to their position over the equator.
Geosynchronous orbits oscillate north and south of the equator in a "figure eight" pattern as A-2 viewed from the planet's surface. The dynamics and subtleties of orbit lend Space control some of the peculiar characteristics examined in this paper. A-3
